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The article examines how the existence of a retailer owned brand,
private label, a¤ects the price setting of a national brand. We …nd
that the potential for a private label introduction may lead to price
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1 Introduction
Retailer owned brands in the grocery sector, often denoted private labels (or
simply store brands), have had an enormous growth in the last decades in
many countries and many product categories (Dobson, 1998; Connor et al,
1996). However, only recently the academic literature has begun to examine
the impact of private labels. Most of the literature, though, are primarily
empirical studies trying to explain the variation in private labels penetration
across product categories (e.g. Sethuraman, 1992; Hoch and Banerji, 1993).
The purpose of this paper is to add to the existing theory of private labels. In
particular, we focus on the intra-category rivalry between a national brand
and a - potential or active - private label.
Results from empirical studies indicate that some national brands use
either brand proliferation (Putsis, 1997) or advertising (Cotterill et al, 2000;
Parker and Kim, 1995) as a strategy to meet the challenge from private
labels, and that a private label’s quality can be crucial for its success in
terms of market share (Hoch and Banerji, 1993). Strategies towards brand
proliferation, advertising and quality is not an issue in this paper. Instead
we are interested in how the threat from private label introduction, and its
actual introduction, will a¤ect prices on national and private labels. The
results from the empirical literature are mixed. Putsis (1997) …nds that
private label introduction lowers the average price of national brands, while
Parker and Kim (1995) …nd that private label introduction can increase prices
on national brands. Cotterill et al (2000) …nd that in some product categories
an increase in private label distribution has the e¤ect of increasing the prices
of national brands, while the opposite is true in other product categories.
A natural response to the observed ambiguity concerning rivalry on prices,
is to step back and start by examining what theory predicts. In a theoretical
model, Mills (1995) predicts that the introduction of a private label results
in lower prices. The reason is that a private label by de…nition eliminates
the double marginalization problem in a distribution channel. While the
price of the private label is set only once, by the retailer, the price of a
national brand is …rst set by the brand manufacturer and then by the retailer.
Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998) …nd that the introduction of a private label
triggers a battle over market shares which results in lower wholesale price
from manufacturers of national brands.1 However, in their model private
1Raju et al (1995) are also investigating the e¤ect of the introduction of a private label.
However, their main focus is on how the introduction of a private label a¤ects a retailer’s
pro…ts and how di¤erent factors a¤ect the private label’s market share. Comparative
statics concerning how the introduction of a private label a¤ects prices on national brands
is not reported.
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label introduction has no e¤ect on the retail price of the national brand.
Our theoretical model is much in the same spirit as Narasimhan and
Wilcox (1998).2 In line with them we distinguish between what we call loyal
and switching consumers. Only the latter group of consumers considers to
switch from buying a national brand to buying a private label. Contrary to
Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998), in our model the switching consumers have
price elastic demand. It turns out that this has important implications for
the retail price of the national brand. In addition, we allow the manufacturer
of the national brand to condition his wholesale price on whether a private
brand is introduced or not.3 In Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998) the national
brand producer has not the option to o¤er an exclusivity contract.4 There-
fore, our focus is distinctly di¤erent from theirs. We examine whether the
retailer will introduce a private label, and, if it does, how the wholesale price
and thereby the …nal price of the national brand is a¤ected. Since the retail
price of the national brand is una¤ected by the private label in Narasimhan
and Wilcox (1998), their main concern is how a private label a¤ects the na-
tional brand producer’s wholesale price. Moreover, they are not focusing on
the question whether a private label will be introduced or not, but rather on
the rivalry that takes place given that a private label is introduced.
We examine how the mere existence of a private label a¤ects the equi-
librium outcome. If private label entry is blockaded the national brand has
a monopoly. This situation is contrasted with the possibility of introduc-
ing a private label. When private label entry is feasible, then one of three
situations may emerge. First, national brand exclusivity may still arise as
an equilibrium outcome and the price of the national brand will go down
2Frank and Salkever (1992) is also a study in much the same spirit, although applied
on a di¤erent industry. They analyse the e¤ects of entry of generic drugs in the pharma-
ceutical industry, and show that it may lead to a price increase for brand name drugs. In
contrast to our setting, they do not model the vertical relationship within the industry,
and therefore they do not raise the issue whether the national brand producer can o¤er
an exclusivity contract and thereby deter entry by the generic brand. Moreover, while
they assume a Stackelberg game with sequential price setting we assume that the …rms
set prices simultaneously.
3Although the producer can o¤er an exclusivity contract, it is common in the existing
literature on vertical restraints to assume that the retailer decides which products it should
carry, see e.g. Bernheim and Whinston (1998), O’Brien and Sha¤er (1993,1997) and
Gabrielsen and Sørgard (1999b). We follow that approach here. For more speci…c studies
of retailer power, see e.g. Dobson and Waterson (1997, 1999) and Gabrielsen and Sørgard
(1999a).
4Note, though, that even then the retailer can …nd it pro…table to not introduce the
private label. This is the case if the national producer’s wholesale price is so low that it is
not pro…table for the retailer to introduce the private label, even though it is allowed to
do so.
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compared to the monopoly outcome. The reason is that the producer of
the national brand may lower its exclusive dealing wholesale price so as to
make it unattractive for the retailer to introduce a private label. Second,
the private label is introduced and the producer of the national brand may
increase its wholesale price compared to monopoly and thereby induce an
increase in the retail price of the national brand as well. The reason is that
the competition for the switching consumers is harsh after a private label
is introduced, and he chooses to concentrate on his loyal consumers and in-
creases his price. Third, the private label is introduced and the price of the
national brand remains una¤ected. This is the case if the national producer
serves only the loyal consumers under monopoly, and thus sets its wholesale
price at its maximum both before and after the introduction of a private
label.
We show that the number of loyal consumers relative to the number of
switching consumers is crucial for the equilibrium outcome. For a relative
low number of loyal consumers, the switching consumers are of relative large
importance to the manufacturer of the national brand. In that case the
threat of private label introduction will induce the producer of the national
brand to reduce its wholesale price and o¤er the retailer exclusivity. For an
intermediate number of loyal consumers the national brand producer serves
also switching consumers in the absence of a private label. Under the threat
of private label the producer of the national brand is better o¤ serving only its
loyal consumers. It therefore increases its wholesale price and stops serving
the switching consumers allowing the retailer to introduce the private brand
and thereby serve the switching consumers. When the number of consumers
that are loyal to the national brand is large enough, the price of the national
brand will be high absent the private label and it will remain so even if a
private label is introduced.
We also examine how the existence of a private label a¤ects consumer
surplus and welfare. Compared to a benchmark situation where private la-
bels are non-existing (national brand monopoly), we show that their mere
existence is bene…cial for both consumers and society. However, the relevant
comparison from a public policy perspective should be between potential
and actual private label introduction. The relevant public policy question
is whether the manufacturer of the national brand imposes national brand
exclusivity in cases where the consumers and society as a whole would prefer
exclusivity. The answer to this is that we may have too much exclusivity
from the viewpoint of the consumers and society, but the opposite may also
be true. Whether or not we will have too much or too little national brand
exclusivity depends on the productions costs of private labels and whether or
not consumers incur costs when switching from a national brand to a private
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brand. If private label production is ine¢cient there is a tendency towards
too much exclusivity from the consumers’ and society’s point of view, and if
consumers have switching costs the opposite may be true.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate our model,
and present the benchmark with national brand monopoly. In Section 3 we
report results for the case of cost di¤erences between the national brand
and the private label, while we in Section 4 report results for the case of
consumer switching costs. Our results are summarized in Section 5, where
we also discuss some implications for empirical testing and for public policy
towards the manufacturer of the national brand.
2 Some preliminaries
We consider a situation where a producer of a national brand sells its brand
through a single retailer. The retailer may distribute the national brand ex-
clusively but may also introduce its own private label. Initially we consider
the equilibrium outcome when there is no threat from a private label. If so,
the national brand manufacturer has a monopoly, and we denote this case
with subscripts m. Thereafter we allow for the introduction of a private
label. The potential introduction of a private label may a¤ect the pricing
policy of the national brand manufacturer. If the private label is not intro-
duced we denote this by subscripts e (for national brand exclusivity). Finally,
if the private label is actually introduced and distributed alongside with the
national brand, we denote this case with subscripts c (for common distribu-
tion). Let r be the retail price of the private label, and pi; wi; Si and Wi,
i 2 fm; e; cg denote the retail price of the national brand, the wholesale price
of the national brand, consumers’ surplus and welfare in the three cases.
The production costs for the national label is normalized to zero, and we
assume that the private label can be procured at a constant marginal cost
c ¸ 0:5 The demand for the national brand consists of two types of consumers.
5This assumption deserves some attention. The normal case would be that private
labels are procured by the retailers at lower costs than national brands. This is a feature
that is captured in our model even if the private brand has higher marginal production
cost than the national brand. The reason for this is that the price-cost margin charged
by national brand producers often exceeds the marginal production cost of the private
label. In fact, in equilibrium we …nd that this is true. Furthermore, when allowing the
private brand to have higher marginal production costs than the national brand, we …nd
this realistic for two reasons. First, private brands often are imported goods and for that
reason they incur trade costs, for instance transportation costs. Second, national brands
may be able to exploit economies of scale as they per de…nition has larger sales as they
are sold in more retail outlets.
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A subset of the consumers are loyal consumers. These consumers purchase
a …xed quantity ® of the national brand provided that the price is below a
choke price pi  1; and will never consider to purchase the private label.
A second set of consumers are potential switchers - denoted by switching
consumers. These consumers have a price elastic demand q = (1 ¡ p) ¯.
The present model makes two di¤erent assumptions regarding the switching
consumers. First, in Section 3 we consider the case where the switching
consumers regard the national and private label as perfect substitutes. In
this case the introduction of a private label at a price lower than the price of
the national brand will attract all switching consumers that have willingness
to pay higher than or equal to the price of the private label. Second, in
Section 4 we consider the case when the switching consumers incur costs
switching from the national brand to the private label (switching costs). If
so, only the switching consumers with high enough willingness to pay and
low enough switching costs will buy the private label.
Before this, we consider our benchmark case when the national brand
producer is an unthreatened monopolist. Aggregate demand for the national
brand then is
qm =
½
®+ (1¡ pm) ¯ if pm 6 1
0 if pm > 1
:
where ® ¸ 0 is the number of loyal consumers and the parameter ¯ ¸ 0
scales up and down the number of switching consumers. Only the relative
size between ® and ¯ are going to be of importance in the following. We
therefore normalize the demand system above by de…ning ¹ = ®
¯
and setting
¯ = 1: The interpretation of a large ¹ is that there are many loyal consumers
relative to switching consumers and vice versa when ¹ is small. The pro…t
of the retailer (r) is written:
¦rm = (pm ¡ wm) (¹+ (1 ¡ pm)) (1)
and the pro…t of the national brand producer (n) is given by:
¦nm = wm (¹+ (1 ¡ pm)) (2)
The following proposition depicts the equilibrium outcomes, consumers’
surplus (S) and welfare (W ) for di¤erent ¹0s assuming national brand monopoly:
Proposition 1 (National brand monopoly). There exists a number ¹M ´
1
3 such that if ¹ 2
£
0; ¹M
¢
, wm = ¹+12 < 1; pm =
3(¹+1)
4 < 1; Sm =
1
32 (5¹+ 1)(1 ¡ 3¹) and Wm = 132 (49¡ 9¹2+ 14¹). Otherwise, wm = 1;
pm = 1; Sm = 0 and Wm = ¹:
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Proof. See the appendix.
For the national brand monopolist there is a trade-o¤ between exploiting
loyal consumers by charging a high price and selling to switching consumers
at a lower price. When the number of loyal relative to switching consumers
is high, the monopolist tends towards exploitation of loyal consumers. It
then sets its wholesale price at its maximum, and serves the loyal consumers
exclusively. When the number of switching consumers relative to loyal con-
sumers is high, it may be worthwhile to sell to both types of consumers. It
then sets a lower wholesale price and serves both groups. This explains why
the manufacturer sells to both groups of consumers when ¹ < 1
3
.
Now we can contrast our model with Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998). In
their model, where …nal demand is una¤ected by price (rectangular demand
curve), a national brand monopolist has no reason to lower its wholesale price
below the consumers’ reservation price. In contrast, in our setting it can be
pro…table for the manufacturer to attract switching consumers by setting
its wholesale price below the loyal consumers’ reservation price and thereby
encourage the retailer to set a price below the loyal consumers’ reservation
price.
3 Private label and cost asymmetries
We now allow for the possibility that the retailer can introduce a private label
at marginal cost c ¸ 0. Even if the retailer has this possibility it may still
choose to grant exclusivity to the national brand. Alternatively, it introduces
a private label and distributes it alongside with the national brand.6 In
this section we assume that if a private label is introduced, the switching
consumers are indi¤erent between the two products.7 Furthermore, we allow
the manufacturer of the national brand to condition its wholesale price on
whether a private label is introduced or not. Let we denote the producer’s
wholesale price given that the retailer does not introduce the private label,
while wc denotes the wholesale price under private label introduction. We
study the following simple game:
Stage 1: The national brand producer o¤ers wholesale prices we and wc:
Stage 2: The retailer introduces a private brand or not, and sets retail
price(s). If the retailer sells the national brand exclusively, for the given we;
6Formally, we may also have that the retailer excludes the national brand when intro-
ducing a private label. However, in the present model the loyal consumers would never
consider buying the private label anyway, so we need not consider this option in our model.
7This may seem as a strong assumption in many circumstances. The next subsection
relaxes this assumption.
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it sets pe. If it introduces a private label, for given wc and c; it sets pc and r:
If the retailer does not introduce a private label its pro…t is written:
¦re = (pe ¡ we) (¹+ (1¡ pe)) ; (3)
and if it introduces the private label its pro…t is:
¦rc = (pc ¡ wc)qc + (r ¡ c)qr; (4)
where qc and qr are the quantities sold of the national and private brand,
respectively. Then we have the following result:
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium outcome). For c 2 [0; 1) there exist a number
¹N(c) ´ c(1¡c)
1¡c such that if ¹ 2
£
0; ¹N(c)
¢
; qr = 0 and we = ¹+ c < 1 and
pe =
2¹+(1+c)
2 < 1. Otherwise, qr > 0 and wc = 1; pc = 1 and r =
1+c
2 .
Furthermore, ¹N(c) < ¹M :
Proof. See the appendix.
As was the case under national brand monopoly, the producer of the na-
tional brand serves only its loyal consumers if the number of loyal consumers
is relatively high (¹ is su¢ciently large). In addition, we see that the pri-
vate label’s unit cost matters. When the production cost of the private label
increases, the attractiveness for the retailer of introducing a private label is
reduced. Therefore, for a given number of loyal versus switching consumers
the national brand producer can increase its wholesale price and still enjoy
exclusivity of his brand in the retail store. This is demonstrated in Proposi-
tion 2 by the fact that both we and pe increase in c:
We also see that the critical ¹ to induce a change in pricing strategy from
the part of the national brand producer is lower under the threat of private
labels than without such a threat. This implies that under the threat of
a private label a lower number of loyal consumers is needed for the manu-
facturer of the national brand to give up exclusivity by setting a high price
and only sell to its loyal consumers. The reason for this is that under the
threat of private label introduction the national brand producer is forced to
price concessions. Consequently, the bene…ts from including the switching
consumers are faster eroded for a threatened national brand producer as ¹
increases.
Corollary 1 (Blockaded entry) If c ¸ 1¡¹
2
´ c; the introduction of a private
label will never occur and its existence will not a¤ect the pricing policy of the
national brand producer.
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Proof. See the appendix.
Now we are ready to investigate the e¤ect of the potential for a private
label. From now on we will restrict attention to the case when entry is not
blockaded, i.e., c < c: By comparing Propositions 1 and 2, we have the
following result:
Proposition 3 (Outcome comparison). i) If ¹ 2 £0; ¹N(c)¢ ; qr = 0; pe <
pm < 1 and we < wm < 1. If ¹ 2
£
¹N(c); ¹M
¢
; qr > 0; pm < pc = 1 and
wm < wc = 1. If ¹ 2
£
¹M;1¢ ; qr > 0; pc = pm = 1 and wc = wm = 1. ii)
The existence of a private label, even if it is not introduced by the retailer,
will always increase the consumers’ surplus and welfare compared to national
brand monopoly.
Proof. See the appendix.
The essence of Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 1, where we have set
c = 1=5.
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
p
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5Relative number of loyal consumers
National brand retail price with and without private label introduction.
The solid line in Figure 1 illustrates the retail price of the national brand
when the producer is a monopolist, while the dotted line illustrates the retail
price of the national brand under the threat of a private label.
We see from Figure 1 that there are three regimes. For low ¹, the national
brand has exclusivity. In this case the private label threat results in a lower
price of the national brand compared to the monopoly case. The reason
is that the number of loyal relative to switching consumers is low, and the
producer is willing to lower its wholesale price to prevent the introduction of
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a private label. He will continue to serve the switching consumers despite the
loss it causes on the existing sale to the loyal consumers. However, the larger
the number of loyal relative to switching consumers is, the larger the loss from
such a strategy. Therefore, for intermediate values of ¹ the producer decides
not to serve the switching consumers, but instead concentrate on the loyal
ones, and the private label is introduced. In this case the wholesale price, as
well as the …nal price, of the national brand increases to unity as a response
to the existence of a private label. This will hurt the loyal consumers as the
price will be above the price resulting from national brand monopoly. For
su¢ciently high ¹, the producer would choose to serve the loyal consumers
exclusively even without the threat of a private label. Then the existence of
a private label has no e¤ect on neither the wholesale nor the retail price of
the national brand, despite the fact that the retailer introduces the private
label.
Compared with national brand monopoly, both the threat and the actual
introduction of private labels always improve both consumers’ surplus and
welfare in this model. In relation to Figure 1 this is easy to understand for
low and high values of ¹: For low values the threat of a private label lowers
wholesale and retail price while preserving exclusivity of the national brand,
which must increase welfare and consumers’ surplus. For high levels of ¹ a
private label is introduced without a¤ecting the price of the national brand,
and the gain in consumers’ surplus and welfare stems from the sale of the
private label to the switching consumers. In the intermediate case there are
two e¤ects. First, the introduction of a private label induces an increase
in the price of a national brand. The price increase for the national brand
is negative for welfare, but the introduction of the private label is positive.
As it turns out, the latter e¤ect dominates and both the consumers and the
society at large are better o¤ with private label introduction.
The comparison with national brand monopoly is valuable as a bench-
mark, but it is not particularly relevant when it comes to public policy issues.
A much more interesting and relevant question for policy is the following:
Given that private labels can be introduced, will they be introduced when
they should? Are they sometimes introduced when they should not? In
other words: are the private incentives to introduce private labels in line
with the social ones? To answer these kinds of questions we must compare
consumers’ surplus and welfare under the threat of introduction and actual
introduction of private labels. To this purpose de…ne ¹W(c) as the critical
¹ above which welfare under private label introduction is higher than under
national brand exclusivity. In the same manner de…ne ¹S(c) as the critical
¹ above which consumers’ surplus under private label introduction is higher
than under national brand exclusivity.
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Then we can show:
Proposition 4 (Public policy). 0 = ¹S(c) < ¹W (c) < ¹N(c) for c 2 [0; c).
Proof. See the appendix.
We see from the proposition there is too much exclusivity seen from both
the consumers’ and the society’s point of view. For low enough ¹0s the
retailer accepts national brand exclusivity without taking into account that
the switching consumers would have been better o¤ with the introduction of
a private label, supplied at a lower price than the price of the national brand.
Will consumers always prefer that private labels actually are introduced?
On the one hand, private label introduction leads to higher or unchanged
price of the national brand. On the other hand, the switching consumers
would be better o¤ with a private label at a lower price than an exclusive
national brand. The statement ¹S(c) = 0 in Proposition 4 says that the
latter e¤ect dominates. Consumers will always be better o¤ with actual
introduction of a private label rather than exclusivity.
From a welfare point of view, the introduction of a private label is cost
ine¢cient. This explains why welfare is higher under exclusivity for small val-
ues of ¹. When ¹ is low, the wholesale and retail price of the national brand
is relatively low under exclusivity. Introducing a private label would bene…t
consumers on aggregate, but we would incur ine¢cient production enough
to reduce welfare. The larger the relative number of loyal consumers (¹); the
higher the price of the national brand under exclusivity, and the larger is the
gain to consumers from the introduction of a private label. Therefore, for
su¢cient high ¹ the gain to the consumers is enough to dominate the welfare
loss from ine¢cient production.
4 Private label and switching costs
When consumers have switching costs and a private label is introduced, only
the share of the switching consumers with low switching costs will buy the
private label. Let ¡(s) denote the share of the switching consumers that has
switching costs lower than or equal to s:8 If a private label is introduced, the
switching consumers will choose whether to buy the private or the national
label. Let ¢ = pc ¡ r denote the price di¤erence between the national and
private label. In equilibrium we must have:
qc = ¹+ (1¡ ¡(¢))(1¡ pc):
8See Klemperer (1987) for a similar modelling approach to switching costs.
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The national label sells to its loyal consumers¹; and the share of the switching
segment whose consumers have reservation price above pc and switching costs
that are higher than the price di¤erence between the two labels. The private
label faces demand from two types of consumers. First, the private label will
sell to switching consumers with reservation price above pc and switching
costs lower than the price di¤erence. Second, the private label will sell to
consumers with reservation price between r and pc; and who have reservation
price minus switching costs above r: Hence, demand for the private label is
written:
qr = ¡(¢)(1 ¡ pc) +
Z pc
x=r
¡(x¡ r)[¡d ((1 ¡ x))] (5)
To simplify, we normalize marginal costs of the private label to zero (c =
0) and assume that s » U [0; L].
Consider …rst the case when the retailer introduces the private label. The
pro…t function of the retailer is written:
¦rc = (pc ¡ wc)
µ
¹+ (1¡ pc ¡ r
L
)(1¡ pc)
¶
+r
µ
pc ¡ r
L
(1¡ pc) +
Z pc
r
x ¡ r
L
dx
¶
m
¦rc = (pc ¡ wc)
µ
¹+
µ
1 ¡ pc ¡ r
L
¶
(1¡ pc)
¶
+r
µ
pc ¡ r
L
(1 ¡ pc) + p
2
c ¡ r2
2L
¶
In a similar setting, Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998) found that di¤erent
equilibria will arise for di¤erent parameter values. In some cases the na-
tional brand manufacturer lowers its wholesale price to induce the retailer to
increase the retail price of the private label and thereby reduce the market
share of the private label. However, for other parameter values the national
brand manufacturer decides to set a high wholesale price so that it serves
only the loyal consumers after the private label is introduced.9 This latter
case can be an equilibrium outcome in our model as well:
9 In Table 1 in Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998), type 3 equilibrium is the one where the
manufacturer of the national brand decides to set a high wholesale price and only serve
the loyal consumers. We see from the parameter values de…ning type 3 equilibrium, that
this equilibrium can be present if one of the following is true: (1) the reservation price is
su¢ciently high, (2) the cost of the private label is su¢ciently high, or (3) the switching
cost is su¢ciently low.
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Proposition 5 (Equilibrium with private label) If the retailer sells the pri-
vate label and ¹ ¸ (6(L¡1)+2
p
3)
p
L
p
3¡3L
3L(6L¡3+p3) ´ ¹K(L), then wc = 1 and pc =
1:
Proof. See the appendix.
The Proposition shows that if the number of loyal consumers are su¢-
ciently large, then the introduction of a private label would in equilibrium
imply that the retail price of the national brand is set at its maximum. This
can be seen by considering the national producer’s decision problem. If there
are many loyal consumers, the national producer would respond to the intro-
duction of a private label by setting his wholesale price as high as possible
(wc = 1) and only serve the loyal consumers. Then, obviously, the retailer
sets a high retail price (pc = 1).
We have chosen to focus on the case shown in Proposition 5, where ¹ ¸
¹K(L). In that case the pro…t function of the retailer reduces to
¦rc = r
µ
1¡ r2
2L
¶
: (6)
When the retailer carries the national brand exclusively his pro…t is
¦re = (pe ¡ we) (¹+ (1¡ pe))
Then we have the following result:
Proposition 6 (Equilibrium outcomes) Let us assume that ¹ ¸ ¹K(L):
i)When L 6 4
9
p
3; qr > 0. ii) When L > 49
p
3; there exists a positive
number ¹N(L) ´ 13
3
q
(L
p
3)¡2
p
3
3L¡
q
(L
p
3)
such that for ¹ 2 £¹K(L); ¹N(L)¢ ; qr = 0;
we =
1
3
3L¹+3L¡2
q
(L
p
3)
L
< 1 and pe = 13
3L¹+3L¡
q
(L
p
3)
L
< 1: Otherwise, qr > 0
and wc = 1; pc = 1 and r =
p
3
3
: Furthermore, ¹K(L) < ¹N(L) < ¹M for
L > 4
9
p
3:
Proof. See the appendix.
When switching costs are low enough there exist no equilibria with na-
tional brand exclusivity. With low switching costs the national brand pro-
ducer must set a very low wholesale price to prevent the introduction of a
private label. In this case it might be better for the manufacturer to allow
the introduction of a private label and concentrate on his loyal consumers.
When switching costs are high enough we have an equilibrium with national
brand exclusivity.
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As in the previous section the relative number between loyal and switching
consumers is of importance for the equilibrium outcome. If ¹ is low enough,
exclusivity will arise and the intuition is as in the previous section. When ¹
is high enough, the national brand producer decides not to deter the private
label and concentrates on exploiting his large group of loyal consumers.
Now we are ready to investigate the e¤ect of the potential for a private
label. By comparing Propositions 1 and 6, we have the following result:
Proposition 7 (Outcome comparison with monopoly). Assume that L >
4
9
p
3: i) If ¹ 2 £¹K(L); ¹N(L)¢ ; qr = 0, pe < pm and we < wm. If ¹ 2£
¹N(L); ¹M
¢
; qr > 0, pm < pc = 1 and wm < wc = 1. Otherwise, qr > 0,
pc = pm = 1 and wc = wm = 1. ii) The existence of a private label, even if it
is not introduced by the retailer, will always increase the consumers’ surplus
and welfare compared to national brand monopoly.
Proof. See the appendix.
Again, we see that the national brand producer threatened to price con-
cessions by a private label gives in earlier and starts charging high prices
from loyal consumers than a pure monopolist would do. When ¹ is small
the retailer carries the national brand exclusively. Due to price concessions
from the producer, both wholesale and retail prices are lower than under
monopoly. When ¹ becomes larger the national brand producer gives in and
starts to exploit his loyal customers and the retailer introduces a private
label. In this case both wholesale and retail prices are higher than those
charged by an unthreatened monopolist. The intuition is as in the previous
section. The monopolist serves both groups, and have to set a low wholesale
price to attract switching consumers. When ¹ increases further, even the
monopolist reaches a point where he exploits only his loyal customers and
does not sell to the switching consumers. In this area retail and wholesale
prices for the national brand are the same in the two cases. However, as
in the previous section the existence of a private label is always better for
consumers and welfare compared to a pure national brand monopoly.
As in the previous section de…ne ¹W(L) and ¹S(L) as the critical ¹ above
which welfare and consumers’ surplus are higher under private label intro-
duction than under national brand exclusivity. Then we have:
Proposition 8 (Public policy) When L > 49
p
3; then ¹K(L) < ¹N(L) <
¹W(L) < ¹S(L):
Proof. See the appendix
Note that compared to Proposition 4 the ranking of ¹N and ¹S have
changed. When some consumers have switching costs, the private incentives
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to introduce private labels are too strong both from a welfare and the con-
sumers’ point of view. This implies that in equilibrium there can be too little
exclusivity seen from the society’s and the consumers’ point of view.
As before the parameter ¹; measuring the relative number of loyal and
switching consumers in the market, is crucial for the outcome. When ¹ is
very low, below ¹N(L); the national brand is carried exclusively by the re-
tailer and this is to the bene…t of both the consumers and the society as a
whole. A relatively low number of loyal consumers make the national brand
producer o¤er a low wholesale price which translates into a relatively low re-
tail price. As the number of loyal relative to switching consumers increases,
the national brand producer gives up selling to the switching consumers, and
increases its price to unity and the private label is introduced. Once ¹ is large
enough to make it privately pro…table for the retailer to introduce a private
label, the loyal consumers have zero consumers’ surplus. The switching con-
sumers now buy the private label, but must bear their switching costs. The
switching costs alone explain why the consumers on aggregate are much less
keener on private label introduction now than in the model without switching
costs. When considering to increase its price to exploit the loyal consumers
and thereby trigger the introduction of a private label, the national brand
producer does not take into account the switching costs that have to be born
by the switching consumers. That is why the national brand producer tend
to give in too early (¹ too low) from the consumers’ and a society’s point of
view.
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
The received theoretical literature predicts that private labels will have a
price-reducing e¤ect or no e¤ect at all on the prices on national brands. Elim-
ination of double marginalization within a distribution system may result in
lower retail prices on national brands. However, as shown by Narasimhan
and Wilcox (1998), private label introduction may a¤ect the rent distribution
between a manufacturer and a retailer without a¤ecting the retail price on
the national brand to consumers. Although we do not disagree that these
e¤ects are of importance, we have pointed out that there are other mecha-
nisms that in some product categories may reverse the competitive e¤ect of
private labels. Our argument is that the existence of a private label as such
may force the manufacturer of the national brand to give price concessions so
that the retailer decides to carry the national brand exclusively. If so, private
label introduction may actually increase retail prices on national brands. The
reason is that the manufacturer of the national brand then decides to give
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up serving the price elastic consumers and rather sells to its loyal consumers
at a high price.
The contrast between our results and the results in the received theo-
retical literature suggests that the competitive e¤ect of private labels can be
distinctly di¤erent from one product category to another. A natural response
to this is to examine the results from empirical studies, to …nd out more about
the competitive (or anticompetitive) e¤ect of private labels. However, our
study indicates that one should be careful with the interpretation of em-
pirical results. In principle, one should distinguish between three di¤erent
situations: (1) no threat of private label introduction, (2) threat of private
label introduction and (3) actual introduction of private labels. Our the-
ory predicts that the price of national brands are lower in case (2) than in
case (1) and (3), if any di¤erence at all.10 To examine the e¤ect of actual
introduction of private labels, one should compare (2) and (3). However,
in data it is di¢cult to distinguish between (1) and (2). A natural way to
test would then be to compare the combination of (1) and (2) with (3). For
example, this is what Putsis (1997) has done, and he …nds that the higher
the market share of private labels the lower the price of the national brands.
However, such a …nding is not inconsistent with our theory, that the actual
introduction of private labels may result in higher prices on national brands.
We simply do not know whether a low market share of private labels is due
to the fact that there is no serious threat from potential private labels [case
(1)] or is due to aggressive price setting by the manufacturer of the national
brand [case (2)]. A more natural empirical test would be to disaggregate
data - if possible - and examine how the manufacturer of a national brand
responds to an actual introduction of a private label. Parker and Kim (1995)
explore this issue, and they …nd that actual introduction results in higher
prices on national brands. However, their explanation is that this is due to
heavy advertising and/or tacit collusion.
Anypossible price-increasing e¤ect of private labels raises questions whether
consumers and society as a whole is better o¤ by the introduction of pri-
vate labels. The received theoretical literature compare a national brand
monopoly with a situation where a private label is introduced. However, we
have argued that the relevant comparison would be between the case where
a manufacturer of a national brand o¤ers the retailer exclusivity and the
case where it does not o¤er exclusivity and allow the retailer to introduce a
private label. We …nd that in some cases there is too little exclusivity. The
manufacturer decides not to o¤er exclusivity when both consumers and so-
10Note that Narasimhan and Wilcox (1998) predicts that the price of the national brand
is unchanged in all situations.
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ciety as a whole would prefer such an outcome. The driving force is that the
consumers incur switching costs when a private label is introduced, a cost not
taken into account by the manufacturer of the national brand. Note that our
model may even underestimate the potential welfare loss from the introduc-
tion of private labels, because we have not taken into account any possible
dead weight loss associated with a higher price on the national brand. Our
results therefore suggest that one should be careful in implementing any re-
strictions on national brand manufacturers exclusivity clauses with retailers.
The consumers and the society as a whole may be better o¤ with price con-
cessions from the national brand producer than with an actual introduction
of a private label.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Maximizing (1) with respect to pm yields the …rst-order condition:
¹+ 1¡ 2pm + wm = 0
and the price
pm =
1
2
(¹+ 1 +wm) : (7)
The producer maximizes (2) with respect to wm yielding the …rst-order con-
dition
1
2
¹+
1
2
¡ wm = 0
and the equilibrium wholesale price
wm =
½
1
2 (¹+ 1) if 0 6 ¹6 1
1 if ¹ > 1
The equilibrium retail price is
pm =
½
3
4
(¹+1) if 0 6 ¹ 6 1
3
´ ¹M
1 if ¹ > ¹M
Hence, depending on the parameters we have two di¤erent equilibria. Type
I: ¹  ¹M : In this case retail and wholesale prices are set at
wm =
1
2
(¹+1)
pm =
3
4
(¹+1)
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The retailer’s pro…t is written
¦r = (pm ¡ wm) (¹+ (1¡ pm)) = 1
16
(¹+ 1)2 ;
and the producer’s pro…t is
¦n = wm (¹+ (1¡ pm)) =
1
8
(¹+ 1)2 :
The consumers’ surplus is written:
Sm =
2¹+ (1 ¡ pm)
2
(1¡ pm) = 1
32
(5¹+1) (1¡ 3¹)
Welfare is written
Wm = pm (¹+ (1¡ pm)) + ¹+¹+ (1¡ pm)
2
(1¡ pm)
=
1
32
¡
49¡ 9¹2 + 14¹¢
Type II: ¹ > ¹M : In this case retail and wholesale prices are set at
wm = 1
pm = 1
and the retailer’s pro…t is written
¦r = (pm ¡ wm)¹ = 0:
The producer’s pro…t is
¦n = wm¹ = ¹
Welfare is written
Wm = pm¹ = ¹
hence the consumers’ surplus is zero. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We solve the game backwards, and start with the retailer’s price setting.
If it carries only the national brand, we have from (7) that it sets the following
retail price:
pe =
¹+ (1 +we)
2
;
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and earns:
¦re =
(¹+ (1 ¡ we))2
4
:
If the retailer carries both brands, it charges the loyal consumers pc = 1 and
maximizes pro…t on the falling demand curve by setting a lower price for the
private label. The producer of the national brand realizes this and therefore
it o¤ers wc = 1, and the retailer earns zero pro…ts selling the national brand.11
If so, the retailer sets the following price of the private label:
r =
1+ c
2
;
and the retailer’s pro…t is the following:
¦rc =
(1 ¡ c)2
4
At stage 1, the producer sets wholesale prices contingent on whether the
retailer carries a national brand or not. First, it can choose to serve only its
loyal customers. Then it has the following pro…t:
¦nc = ¹
Alternatively, it can set we such that the retailer is better o¤ with only
carrying his product than with carrying both products. This is true if:
¦re ¡ ¦rc > 0
Solving with respect to we, we have that the retailer is better o¤ with only
the national brand if
we < ¹+ c ´ w¤e
If w = w¤e, the producer’s pro…t is the following:
¦ne =
(1¡ c)(¹+ c)
2
By comparison, we …nd that ¦ne > ¦
n
c if:
c(1¡ c)¡ (1 + c)¹
2
> 0:
11This would make the retailer indi¤erent between carrying the national label or not.
As a tie-break assumption we assume that when indi¤erent, he chooses to sell the national
brand.
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We see that this is true if
¹ <
c(1 ¡ c)
1 + c
´ ¹N(c):
Then we have that
¹N(c) ´ c(1¡ c)
1 + c
<
1
3
´ ¹M
m
c < 1
which is always true. QED.
Proof of Corollary 1:
Follows from comparing wm and w¤e from Proposition 1 and 2. When
wm 6 w¤e , c ¸ 1¡¹2 the national brand producer always sets the monopoly
wholesale price and the retailer will never introduce a private label. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Part i) follows directly from a comparison between Proposition 1 and
2. To prove part ii) note …rst that the mere threat of a private label is
bene…cial for the consumers and welfare if ¹ 2 £0; ¹N(c)¢. The producer
of the national brand lowers the wholesale price to stop the retailer from
introducing the private label. Second, if ¹ 2 £¹M ;1¢ the monopolist serves
only loyal consumers, and the introduction of a private label is bene…cial for
the switching consumers who initially were not served by the producer of the
national brand which also enhances welfare. However, for ¹ 2 £¹N(c); ¹M¢,
the e¤ect is ambiguous because loyal consumers get higher prices whereas
switching consumers get lower prices. The consumers’ surplus in this case is
written:
Sc =
(1¡ r)2
2
=
1
8
¡ 1
4
c+
1
8
c2
whereas Sm is given by Proposition 1.
Sc ¸ Sm
m
1
4
µ
1
2
¡ c + 1
2
c2
¶
¸ 1
32
(5¹+ 1)(1 ¡ 3¹)
which is always positive for c 2 [0; 1] and ¹ ¸ 0: Welfare when the private
label is introduced is given by
Wc = ¹+ Sc + (1¡ r)(r ¡ c) = ¹+
3
8
¡ 3
4
c +
3
8
c2
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and Wm is given in Proposition 1.
Wc ¸ Wm
m
¹+
3
8
¡ 3
4
c +
3
8
c2 ¸ 1
32
¡
49¡ 9¹2 + 14¹¢
which is always positive for c 2 [0; 1] and ¹ ¸ 0: QED.
Proof of Proposition 4:
First, note that when ¹ 2 £¹M ´ 1
3
;1¢ it is better for both consumers
and welfare that the private label is introduced. The reason is that the
private label includes the switching consumers without a¤ecting the pricing
of the national brand. Second, look at the interval ¹ 2 £0; ¹M¢ : Consumers’
surplus when national brand has exclusivity is
Se =
¹+ (1¡ pe) +¹
2
(1 ¡ pe)
=
1
2
µ
¹+
1
2
¡ 1
2
c
¶µ
1
2
¡ ¹¡ 1
2
c
¶
whereas if the private label is introduced consumers’ surplus is
Sc =
(1¡ r)2
2
=
1
8
(c ¡ 1)2
Then we have that consumers are better o¤ under private label introduction
if:
Sc ¸ Se
m
1
8
(c¡ 1)2 ¸ 1
2
µ
¹+
1
2
¡ 1
2
c
¶µ
1
2
¡ ¹¡ 1
2
c
¶
m
1
2
¹2 ¸ 0;
i.e. always. Then look at welfare under national brand exclusivity:
We = Se + pe (¹+ (1 ¡ pe))
=
1
2
µ
¹+
1
2
¡ 1
2
c
¶µ
1
2
¡ ¹¡ 1
2
c
¶
+
µ
¹+
1
2
+
1
2
c
¶ µ
1
2
¡ 1
2
c
¶
21
and welfare under private label introduction
Wc = ¹+Sc + (1¡ r)(r ¡ c)
= ¹+
3
8
c2 ¡ 3
4
c+
3
8
Then we have that welfare is higher under private label introduction if:
Wc ¸ We
m
1
2
¹+
1
2
c2 ¡ 1
2
c+
1
2
¹2 +
1
2
¹c ¸ 0
m
¹ ¸
p
(1 + 6c¡ 3c2) ¡ 1¡ c
2
´ ¹W (c)
Moreover, we have that
¹W (c) 6 ¹N(c)
mp
(1 + 6c ¡ 3c2)
2
¡ 1 + c
2
6 c(1¡ c)
1 + c
Solving this with equality yields two solutions fc = 1g ; fc = 0g ; hence for c 2
(0; 1) the inequality either holds for all values or it does not hold. Inserting
for c = 1
2
we have that 0:15139 6 0:166 67 which holds, hence ¹W (c) < ¹N(c)
for c 2 (0; 1) : QED.
Proof of Proposition 5:
We have that if
@¦rc
@pc
= L(¹+ 1) ¡ 2pc(L+ 1)+ 3p2c + r(2 + r) ¡ 3rpc + wc(1¡ 2pc +L+ r) ¸ 0;
then the retailer would set pc = 1: If pc = 1; then we know that r =
p
3
3
(see
the proof of Proposition 6 that follows). Evaluated at pc = 1; we thus have
that @¦
r
c
@pc
¸ 0 if
¹ ¸ 3L ¡ 4 +
p
3(1¡ wc) + 3wc(1¡ L)
3L
´ ¹K(L;wc)
It can easily be seen that if wc = 1; the condition is met for all relevant values
of ¹; that is ¹ > 0: For lower values of wc; though, ¹K can be positive. It
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is obvious that the national producer will never set wc < we; the wholesale
price that deters the retailer from introducing the private label. If we set
wc = we (where we is found in Proposition 6 to follow) then we have the
expression shown in the Proposition. This is a su¢cient condition for pc = 1
in equilibrium. QED.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Given that pc = 1 and wc = 1; maximizing (6) with respect to the price
of the private label yields the …rst-order condition:
1¡ 3r2
2L
= 0;
and the optimal price for the private label is
r =
p
3
3
:
Inserting this and wc = 1 in (6) yields:
¦rc =
Ãp
3
3
!µ
1
3L
¶
=
1
9L
p
3: (8)
Suppose now that the retailer only carries the national brand. From (7) we
have that for a given we it sets the price
pe =
1
2
(¹+1 +we) (9)
and earns
¦re =
(¹+ 1¡ we)2
4
(10)
Comparing (10) and (8) reveals that the retailer will not introduce the private
label if
(¹+ 1¡ we)2
4
¸ 1
9L
p
3
m
we 6
1
3
3L¹+3L¡ 2
q¡
L
p
3
¢
L
´ w¤e
which de…nes the highest wholesale price that the producer can charge to
prevent the introduction of a private label. We have that w¤e < 1 if ¹ <
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2
3
q
(L
p
3)
L
: Inserting w¤e for we in (9) yields the retailer’s optimal price given
that the private label is going to be deterred, pe: Given this, quantity sold is
qe = ¹+ (1¡ pe): Doing this yields:
pe =
8<:
3L¹+3L¡
q
(L
p
3)
3L
if ¹ <
q
(L
p
3)
3L
1 if ¹ ¸
q
(L
p
3)
3L
qe =
8<:
q
(L
p
3)
3L
if ¹ <
q
(L
p
3)
3L
¹ if ¹ ¸
q
(L
p
3)
3L
:
For ¹ <
q
(L
p
3)
3L
we will have exclusivity and the national brand producer
will earn
¦ne = weqe =
Ã
3L¹+ 3L¡ 2
r³
L
p
3
´! q¡Lp3¢
9L2
:
Hence, we have that
¦ne ¸ ¦nc
mÃ
3L¹+3L¡ 2
r³
L
p
3
´! q¡Lp3¢
9L2
¸ ¹
m
¹N(L) ´ 1
3
3
q¡
L
p
3
¢ ¡ 2p3
3L¡
q¡
L
p
3
¢ ¸ ¹
By simple computation we have that ¹N(L) 6 0() L 6 4
9
p
3 proving part
i). We must now check that ¹N(L) 6
q
(L
p
3)
3L so that in fact pe < 1 for
L > 4
9
p
3: This amounts to the condition ¡1
3
p
3
3L¡
q
(L
p
3)
6 0 for L > 4
9
p
3
which is always true.
We have that ¹N(L) < ¹M () 1
3
3
q
(L
p
3)¡2
p
3
3L¡
q
(L
p
3)
¡ 1
3
< 0 which is always
true for L > 49
p
3: Finally, by comparison we have that ¹K(L) < ¹N(L) if:
3L¡ p3
p
L
p
3
(3L¡
p
L
p
3)(6L¡ 3 +p3)
> 0:
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It can be shown that this condition is met if L = 49
p
3: Then, obviously, it
also holds for L > 49
p
3:QED.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Part i) follows directly from comparing Propositions 1 and 5. To prove
part ii) …rst note that for ¹ 2 £0; ¹N(L)¢ no private label is introduced, but
due to threat of introduction the national brand producer sets a lower price
than the monopolist, hence both consumers’ surplus and welfare is increased
by the existence of a private label. Second, when ¹ 2 £¹M;1¢ the monopolist
serves loyal consumers exclusively, whereas private label introduction also
includes some switching consumers and welfare and consumers’ surplus also
increase in this case. For ¹ 2 £¹N(L); ¹M¢ private label introduction will
increase the price to loyal consumers whereas switching consumers will get a
lower price compared to the monopoly case. Under private label introduction
the consumers’ surplus is
Sc =
1
2
(1¡ r) qr = 118
³
3¡
p
3
´ 1
L
:
Then we have that
Sc ¸ Sm
m
1
18
³
3 ¡
p
3
´ 1
L
¸ 1
32
(5¹+ 1)(1 ¡ 3¹)
which holds for any ¹; L ¸ 0: Welfare under private label introduction is
Wc = ¹+ rqr +
1
2
(1 ¡ r)qr
=
1
18
18L¹+
p
3 + 3
L
:
Then we have that
Wc ¸ Wm
m
1
18
18L¹+
p
3 + 3
L
¸ 1
32
¡
49 ¡ 9¹2 +14¹¢
which is easily veri…ed to hold for any ¹; L ¸ 0: QED.
Proof of Proposition 8:
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The consumers’ surplus and welfare under private label introduction is de-
rived in the proof of Proposition 6. When the private label is not introduced
the consumers’ surplus is
Se =
1
2
(qe+ ¹) (1¡ pe) = 1
18
Ã
3L¹+
r³
L
p
3
´! ¡3L¹+q¡Lp3¢
L2
;
and welfare
We = peqe+
1
2
(qe+ ¹) (1¡ pe)
=
1
18
6
p
L 4
p
3¹+6
p
L 4
p
3¡ p3 ¡ 9L¹2
L
Comparing these yields:
Se ¸ Sc
m
1
18
Ã
3L¹+
r³
L
p
3
´! ¡3L¹+q¡Lp3¢
L2
¸
µ
1
18
³
3¡
p
3
´ 1
L
¶
m
1
18L
³
¡9L¹2 +2
p
3¡ 3
´
¸ 0
m
¹6 1
3L
r³
L
³
2
p
3 ¡ 3
´´
´ ¹S(L)
and for welfare
We ¸ Wc
m
1
18
6
p
L 4
p
3¹+ 6
p
L 4
p
3 ¡p3¡ 9L¹2
L
¸ 1
18
18L¹+
p
3 + 3
L
m
¹ 6 1
3
p
L 4
p
3¡ 3L+pL
q¡
3(3L¡ 1)¡ p3¢
L
´ ¹W (L)
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The following …gure plots ¹N(L) (lower line), ¹W (L) (middle) and ¹S(L)
(upper line) for L 2 ¡49p3; 1¤
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.78 0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1L
QED.
References
[1] Bernheim, B. D. and M. D. Whinston (1998): ”Exclusive Dealing”,
Journal of Political Economy, 106: 64-103.
[2] Connor, J. M., R. T. Rogers and V. Bhagavan (1996): ”Concentration
Change and Counterwailing Power in the U.S. Food Manufacturing In-
dustry”, Review of Industrial Organization, 11: 473-492.
[3] Cotterill, R. W., W. P. Putsis and R. Dahr (2000): ”Assessing the
Competitive Interaction between Private Labels and National Brands”,
Journal of Business, 73(1): 109-138.
[4] Dobson, P. (1998): ”The Economic Welfare Implications of Own La-
bel Goods,” mimeo, School of Management and Finance, University of
Nottingham.
[5] Dobson, P. and M. Waterson (1997): ”Counterwailing Power and Con-
sumer Prices”, Economic Journal, 107: 418-430.
[6] Dobson, P. and M. Waterson (1999): ”Retailer Power: Recent Develop-
ments and Policy”, Economic Policy, 0(28): 133-156.
[7] Frank, R. G. and D. S. Salkever (1992): ”Pricing, Patent Loss and the
Market for Pharmaceuticals”, Southern Economic Journal, 59: 165-179.
27
[8] Gabrielsen, T. S and L. Sørgard (1999a): ”Discount Chains and Brand
Policy”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101: 127-142.
[9] Gabrielsen, T. S and L. Sørgard (1999b): ”Exclusive Versus Common
Dealership”, Southern Economic Journal, 66: 353-366.
[10] Hoch, S. J. and S. Banerji (1993): ”When do Private Labels Succeed?”,
Sloan Management Review, Summer 1993, 57-67.
[11] Klemperer, P. (1987): ”Markets with consumer switching costs,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 102, 375-94.
[12] Mills, D. E. (1995): ”Why Retailers Sell Private Labels”, Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy, 4: 509-528.
[13] Narasimhan, C. and R. T. Wilcox (1998): ”Private Labels and the Chan-
nel Relationship: A Cross-Category Analysis”, Journal of Business, 71:
573-600.
[14] O’Brien, D. M. and G. Sha¤er (1993): ”On the Dampening-of-
Competition E¤ect of Exclusive Dealing”, Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics, 41:215-221.
[15] O’Brien, D. M. and G. Sha¤er (1997): ”Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Ex-
clusive Dealing, and Equilibrium Market Foreclosure”, Journal of Eco-
nomics & Management Strategy, 6: 755-785.
[16] Parker P. M. and N. Kim (1995): ”National Brands versus Private-
Labels: An empirical Study of Competition, Advertising, and Collu-
sion”, mimeo.
[17] Putsis, W. P. (1997): ”An Empirical Study of the E¤ect og Brand Pro-
liferation on Private Label - National Brand Pricing Behaviour”, Review
of Industrial Organization, 12: 355-371.
[18] Putsis, W. P. and R. W. Cotterill (1999): ”Share, Price and Category
Expenditure - Geographic Market E¤ects and Private Labels”, Manage-
rial and Decision Economics, 20: 175-187.
[19] Raju, S. J., R. Sethuraman and S. K. Dahr (1995): ”The Introduction
and Performance of Store Brands”, Management Science, 61: 957-978.
[20] Sethuraman, R. (1992): ”The E¤ect of Marketplace Factors on Private
Label Penetration in Grocery Products”, Working Paper no. 92-128,
Marketing Science Institute.
28
